Michigan Law Review
Volume 81

Issue 3

1983

Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?
Anthony D'Amato
Northwestern University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol81/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMMENT

IS EQUALITY A TOTALLY EMPTY IDEA?
Anthony D'Amato *
Professor Peter Westen's essay asserting that the concept of
equality has no substantive content whatsoever usefully brushes
aside much of the equal-protection rhetoric that, as Westen carefully
explains, appropriately belongs to substantive due process.• However, his absolutist position is open to challenge. I would like to
posit one hypothetical case that I used in my classes when I taught
Constitutional Law that I think contradicts Professor Westen's thesis. If it does, then there will be other cases as well, and his position
cannot stand as the logically tight construct that he repeatedly asserts
that it is.
I. A

HYPOTHETICAL CASE

Let us suppose that a state legislature decides to restrict motorists' use of gasoline by enacting a statute allowing drivers to
purchase gasoline only on weekdays if their license plate is oddnumbered and only on weekends if their license plate is even-numbered. The even-numbered drivers, constituting about half the motorists in the state, will thus effectively be restricted to purchasing
gasoline on Saturdays, or in other words will have one fifth the opportunity to purchase of the drivers who have odd-numbered plates.
We can assume that this statute is not an attempt to reduce lines at
service stations (actual statutes have done this by, for example, allowing odd-numbered plates to purchase gasoline on odd-numbered
days), but rather to cut down on total gasoline consumption. We can
further assume that the legislature calculated that the great difficulty
of purchase now imposed upon even-numbered drivers will reduce
total gasoline consumption by the desired amount in that state.
Suppose now that the even-numbered drivers bring a class-action
suit to declare the statute unconstitutional. Have they been denied
substantive due process? No, because the means selected by the legislature to reduce gasoline consumption is rationally related to its
goal. In fact, it is probably cheaper than the alternative of issuing
ration points to all drivers. Moreover, since the legislature could
• Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B. 1958, Cornell University; J.D. 1961, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1968, Columbia University. - Ed.
I. Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
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have stopped the sale of gasoline in the state entirely, cutting back on
sales by the means chosen was well within the legislature's power.
Instead, the only real complaint that the even-numbered drivers
have is that they have not been treated equally with the odd-numbered drivers. Here one can imagine Professor Westen saying, "But
they are not equal - they are different in precisely the difference
articulated by the legislature, namely, that they possess license plates
that are divisible by 2 whereas the other drivers do not possess such
plates." To be sure, this is, logically speaking, a difference. But the
fact is that the "difference" selected by the legislature was a random
one; it was arbitrary. 2 If people are subject to arbitrary classifications, they are not being treated equally. Only if the classifications
are nonarbitrary can we agree with Professor Westen that the
"equality" rhetoric falls out, because then the classification defines
the relevant difference such that the two groups should now be
treated "unalike."
If the foregoing example contradicts Professor Westen's thesis,
then elaborating it along his lines will worsen the situation and
demonstrate the consequences of his mode of analysis. Accordingly,
let us elaborate upon the hypothetical case by positing some legislative history that explains why the even-numbered drivers were relegated to the weekends. Suppose that a bill proposing a statute such
as the one that was passed was circulated among members of the
legislature, and suppose further that those members of the legislature
who owned automobiles were split among even-numbered and oddnumbered license-plate owners. Sensing that a bill may be passed in
the next session of the legislature, the solons whose plates are evennumbered apply to the Registry of Motor Vehicles for new, oddnumbered plates. When all of them have received their new plates,
so that now all legislators have odd-numbered plates, the bill is enacted into law.3 Now we have a real reason for the difference between odd and even. According to Professor Westen, such a reason
is the key to why equality analysis is purely formal, since it explains
that this legislative classification, like all others, defines the differences between people. But this is precisely what is wrong with his
analysis. For while this is an explanation, it does not help take the
case out of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, it puts it even more
solidly within that clause.4
2. Of course, not all random or arbitrary statutes are violative of substantive due process,
for example, a statewide lottery allowing gasoline purchases to the lucky numbers drawn out
of a hat, with all motorists having an equal chance.
3. This hypothetical extension is a variant of Professor Westen's co=ent on Morey v.
.Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), that a distinction could have been the greater "lobbying power" of
American Express. Westen, supra note I, at 576. (Morey was overruled by New Orleans v.
.Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)).
4. It is not a violation of substantive due process for the legislators to favor themselves;
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THERE A DIFFERENT NORMATIVE STANDARD ANTERIOR
TO EQUALITY!

Professor Westen has responded to the hypothetical case that I
have presented in the first Part of this paper by formulating a prescriptive standard that he believes is logically anterior to any concept
of equality:
The state shall not pursue its ends by imposing a great burden on one
class of persons where it could fully achieve its ends by imposing a
considerably lesser burden on that or another class of persons.5

However, his standard is not, and cannot be, a logical presupposition
of the idea of equality.
To simplify the analysis, let us assign a burden of 5 to my class of
drivers with even-numbered license plates, representing the five days
of the week that they cannot purchase gasoline, and a burden of 1 to
the odd-numbered class. Professor Westen's standard would require
a reduction on the burden of the even class by, for example, lowering
it from 5 to 2. But then, in order to fully achieve the state's ends of a
reduction in the availability of gasoline, there must be an increase on
the odd class from 1 to 4. Thus:
Original hypothetical:
5 (even class) + 1 (odd class) = 6
Westen".r standard, first application:
2 (even class)

+ 4 (odd class) = 6

However, it is now apparent upon inspection that the new arrangement continues to violate the Westen standard, although from
the opposite direction. We must apply the standard again, this time
reducing the burden on the odd class and increasing it on the even
class. If we had no idea of the concept of equality, we would be
required to continue applying the standard indefinitely, until at some
point we would hit upon an equilibrium position where there can be
no further violation of the statutory standard:
Westen standard, final application:
3 (even class)

+ 3 (odd class) = 6

In brief, the concept of equality is inherent in Westen's standard.
The standard is simply a cumbersome way of saying that the two
classes of persons must receive equal protection under the law.
Yet one might object that the procedure of successive applications of the standard until equality is reached shows that the standard is anterior to the concept of equality. This objection cannot be
maintained, however, due to a hidden assumption in the very procesuppose the statute exempted all legislators (because of the public nature of their duties) from
the odd-even restrictions. Thus, in my hypothetical, the reason the legislators voted for the
odd numbers was sufficient but not necessary.
5. Westen, The Meaning ofEquality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH,
L. REv. 604 (1983).

January 1983]

Equality Empty Idea?

603

dure I described of successive applications of the standard. For the
only way we know what direction to move in making reductions and
increases in burdens is to have a concept of equality in mind. The
only way we can know that one burden is "great" and another burden is "considerably lesser," to use the words in Professor Westen's
standard, is to compare the burdens. But comparison presupposes a
measure of equality, for we cannot know that one burden is greater
than another unless we first have a concept of when the two burdens
are equal.6
Professor Westen's standard, therefore, is logically posterior to
the concept of equality. If we start with the Equal Protection Clause,
then a standard such as Professor Westen's,7 which he attempts to
ground in substantive due process, 8 can be given operative content.
Professor Westen's analysis is provocative and extremely useful.
It serves the legal profession by employing recent analytical tools
developed by philosophers of language. However, as the exchange
in this Review may evidence, his first essay was not, contrary to his
claim, the "last analysis." 9

6. More precisely, to compare the magnitude of any two sets, place their members into
one-to-one correspondence. When this procedure exhausts the members of one set, then that
set is equal to the part of the other set that has been exhausted, with the remaining members of
the latter set constituting the amount by which the latter set exceeds the former. If at the point
of exhaustion of the first set the second set is also exhausted, the two sets are equal.
7. Any variation in Professor Westen's suggested standard that might avoid the terms
"greater'' or "lesser," and yet still apply to my hypothetical case, would also presuppose the
concept of equality. For instance, if the burdens are imposed "proportionately upon all affected classes of persons," proportionality cannot be determined without first defining the
mathematical-logical relation of e9.uality.
8. Westen, supra note 5, at 649. The Supreme Court used the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment to give content to the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), invalidating public school discrimination in the District
of Columbia. Sees. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN
TO ALEXANDER 82-83, 100, 455 n.48 (1977).
9. Westen, supra note 1, at 577 n.136.

